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Domeij and Klein (2005) have shown that the welfare gains of an optimal capital and
labor income tax reform decline the longer the reform is pre-announced before its
implementation. In other words, pre-announcement is costly in terms of welfare.
I reexamine their claim by taking two additional features of government spending
into account: public goods and public capital. In my baseline optimal reform, I
show that valuable and productive government spending is likely to reduce the wel-
fare costs of pre-announcement. Further, the baseline optimal pre-announced reform
displays short-run conﬁscation and/or subsidy of capital and labor income. As a
further contribution, I show that these short-run properties are not important for the
welfare gains of pre-announced reforms with sufﬁciently long pre-announcement
duration. In particular, a 4 years pre-announced suboptimal reform in which taxes
move - without conﬁscation and subsidy - directly to their endogenous long-run
values at the implementation date generates similar welfare gains as the 4 years pre-
announced baseline optimal reform. The underlying tax structure of both reforms,
however, appears to be very different.
Key words: pre-announced optimal tax reform, public goods, public capital, conﬁs-
cation, subsidy, welfare
JEL Classiﬁcation: E0, E6, H0
1 Introduction
Should ﬁscal policy pre-announce tax reforms before their implementation from a
welfare point of view? This paper sheds new light on this issue. Domeij and Klein
(2005) show that the welfare gains of an optimal capital and labor tax reform de-
cline the longer the reform is pre-announced before its implementation. Hence, pre-
announcement is costly in terms of welfare. The authors argue that the incentive
effects of the future anticipated tax reform are dominated by the time delay effect
and therefore ﬁscal policy should not pre-announce this type of tax reform.
In line with the classical optimal taxation literature, Domeij and Klein (2005) use a
neoclassical growth model in which the ﬁscal authority collects distortionary taxes.
The resulting tax revenues are rebated lump-sum to households or represent simply
wasteful government spending. Is that an economically sensible description of the
behavior of e.g. US ﬁscal policy? I believe it is not. Rather, I observe that ﬁscal policy
uses tax revenues also to provide e.g. public goods and public capital. In this paper,
2I describe public goods as non-productive but directly utility providing expenditures
like government consumption while public capital describes productive government
spending that is likely to affect private sector production through a public capital
stock.
If these valuable and productive elements of government spending adjust endoge-
nously in general equilibrium they are likely to affect the welfare consequences of
pre-announced tax reforms. What are these welfare implications quantitatively?
Does pre-announcement become more or less costly for a society in terms of wel-
fare when taking public goods and public capital into account?
I attempt to answer this question by analyzing the welfare consequences of opti-
mal pre-announced capital and labor tax reforms in a calibrated neoclassical growth
model augmented with valuable and productive government spending.
My approach allows me to investigate an additional interesting issue. It turns out
that the short- and long-run properties of the optimal tax system appear to be quan-
titatively very different. Put differently, the baseline optimal pre-announced tax re-
form displays short-run conﬁscation and/or subsidy of capital and labor income
followed by a rather quick transition to the steady state of taxes. How important
are the short-run properties of the optimal tax system for the resulting welfare gains
of the pre-announced tax reform? In other words, is conﬁscation and/or subsidy
quantitatively important for the resulting overall welfare gains of pre-announced tax
reforms?
Therefore, the goal of this paper is twofold. First, I reexamine the claim of Domeij
and Klein (2005) by taking two additional features of government spending explic-
itly into account: public goods and public capital. In other words, I examine the
welfare consequences of utility providing government consumption and productive
government capital in a pre-announced optimal tax reform. Second, I analyze how
important the short-run properties of the optimal tax system - in other words con-
3ﬁscation and/or subsidy of capital and labor income - are for the resulting overall
welfare gains of the pre-announced tax reform.
My analysis employs a standard neoclassical growth model with distortionary tax-
ation. The key ingredients of the model are endogenous government consumption
that is part of a household utility function as well as productive government capital
that enters the production function of ﬁrms, similar to Baxter and King (1993).
Suppose, the Ramsey planner is benevolent and is able to commit itself to the follow-
ing type of tax reform. At time zero he credibly pre-announces an optimal capital
and labor income tax reform that will be implemented at some future point in time. I
study the transition to the Ramsey steady states as well as the welfare consequences
of different pre-announcement horizons.
In my baseline optimal tax reform I ﬁnd that valuable and productive government
spending leads to higher absolute welfare gains and makes
pre-announcement less costly in terms of relative welfare gain reductions. More pre-
cisely, I ﬁnd that the welfare gain of the baseline immediate optimal capital and labor
income tax reform corresponds to a permanent increase of private consumption of
6.6 percent. By contrast, the welfare gain is 5 percent if the reform is pre-announced
4 years in advance. Hence, relative welfare gains fall by roughly 24 percent. By
contrast, for a baseline optimal tax reform with ﬁxed and non-valued government
consumption and without public capital the welfare gains amount to 5.3 percent (im-
mediate) and 3.4 percent (4 years pre-announced). This implies a relative reduction
of welfare gains by roughly 36 percent similar to Domeij and Klein (2005). Hence, for
my baseline reform, valuable and productive government spending - as employed in
our model - leads to higher absolute welfare gains and makes pre-announcement
less costly in terms of relative welfare gain reductions.
These results depend of course on the valuation of government consumption by
households as well as on the public capital share in private production. I show that
4if either the valuation of government consumption or the public capital share are low
or high then pre-announcement is less costly than in an economy without valuable
and productive government spending. Interestingly, if both the valuation of govern-
ment consumption and the public capital share are moderate then pre-announcement
can be as costly as in an economy without these ingredients. A sensitivity analysis
based on empirically reasonable parameter estimates reveals that for the overwhelm-
ing majority of parameter combinations pre-announcement is less costly than in an
economy without valuable and productive government spending. Hence, I conclude
that public goods and public capital are likely to reduce the welfare losses that are
associated with pre-announcement.
Thus, my results show that the welfare costs of pre-announcing an optimal tax re-
form are likely to be smaller than previously thought. Interestingly, the reduction
of welfare costs due to a more realistic description of the spending side of ﬁscal
policy are not dramatic. Nevertheless, they are economically signiﬁcant and there-
fore, the effects of valuable and productive government spending should be taken
into account when beneﬁts and costs of an optimal pre-announced tax reform are
considered.
The second contribution of this paper focuses on the question whether short-run
properties of the optimal pre-announced tax system are important for the resulting
overall welfare gains. The baseline optimal tax reform displays short-run conﬁscation
and/or subsidy of capital and labor income followed by a rather quick transition to
the long-run values of taxes. How important is this short-run deviation from the
long-run optimal taxes for the welfare consequences of the reform? In order to
answer this question, we design a tax reform in which capital and labor income
taxes move - without conﬁscation and subsidy - directly to their endogenous long-
run values from the implementation date of the reform onwards. I argue that this
pattern for the path of taxes is more in line with observed behavior of ﬁscal policy.
Interestingly, I show that welfare gains for this “no conﬁscation/subsidy” tax reform
5increase with the pre-announcement horizon as opposed to the decrease observed in
the baseline optimal pre-announced tax reform.
In particular, I show that welfare gains for the “no conﬁscation/subsidy” tax reform
increase substantially with the pre-announcement horizon. An immediate reform
generates 3.5 percent higher permanent private consumption. By contrast, a 4 years
pre-announced tax reform yields 4.7 percent higher permanent private consumption.
Thus, I ﬁnd that relative welfare gains increase by roughly 35 percent if the tax reform
is pre-announced 4 years in advance.
Moreover, I show that the level of welfare gains is very different for the baseline
optimal and the “no conﬁscation/subsidy” reform in case of immediate implemen-
tation. By contrast, the level of welfare gains becomes very similar for 4 years pre-
announcement. Despite this, however, the underlying structure of taxes in both
reforms appears still to be very different. For 4 years pre-announcement, the ﬁrst
freely chosen capital tax in the baseline optimal tax reform is still 178 percent. By
contrast, the “no conﬁscation/subsidy” reform moves straight to zero percent capi-
tal taxes. The resulting loss of revenues in the “no conﬁscation/subsidy” reform is
made up for by moving to moderately higher steady state labor taxes of 30 percent
compared to 28 percent in the baseline optimal tax reform.
Therefore, my results indicate that conﬁscation and subsidy of capital and labor
income are not important for the level of welfare gains that arise from an optimal
tax reform which is sufﬁciently pre-announced in advance of its implementation.
Finally, I show that my results prevail qualitatively even if the government has no
access to government debt.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the model. The results of
the pre-announced tax reforms are discussed in section three. Section four reviews
the related literature. Finally, section four concludes.
62 The Model
I use a standard neoclassical growth model similar to the one employed by Domeij
and Klein (2005). However, with respect to utility providing government consump-
tion and productive public capital I draw from the model in Baxter and King (1993).
2.1 Economic Environment
Time is discrete, t = 0,1,...,¥. The representative household maximizes the dis-
counted sum of life-time utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint and a








t )ct + xt + qtbt = (1  tn
t )wtnt + (1  tk
t )(dt   d)kt 1
+dkt 1 + bt 1 + st + Pt
kt = (1  d)kt 1 + xt
where ct, nt, kt, xt and bt denote private consumption, hours worked, capital, in-
vestment and government bonds. qt is the price that the household has to pay per
government bond. The household takes government consumption gt as given. Fur-
ther, the household receives the wage wt for supplying labor as well as dividends
dt for renting out capital to the ﬁrms. In addition, the household receives proﬁts Pt
from the ﬁrms and lump-sum transfers st from the government. The household has
to pay distortionary taxes on consumption, labor and capital income. By contrast to
Domeij and Klein (2005), I add consumption taxes to the model since they reﬂect an
important part of government tax revenue in US data, see e.g. Trabandt and Uhlig
(2006).
7The representative ﬁrm maximizes its period-by-period proﬁts subject to a Cobb-
Douglas production technology. Formally,
maxkt 1,nt ft(kt 1,nt,k
g













t 1 denotes the public capital stock that is provided by the government. Note
that equilibrium proﬁts of the ﬁrm will be zero as long as qk + qn = 1 which I will
impose when calibrating the model.
The government faces the following budget constraint,
gt + st + bt 1 + x
g
t = tc
t ct + tn
t wtnt + tk
t (dt   d)kt 1 + qtbt. (3)
where x
g
t denotes government investment in the public capital stock. The latter has
the following law of motion,
k
g





At this point I would like to highlight the key differences to the model in Domeij and
Klein (2005). First, government consumption gt provides utility for the household
and second, public capital k
g
t 1 contributes to private production. A minor difference
is the explicit introduction of consumption taxes for the reason given above.
2.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Given the economic environment, I am now ready to deﬁne a competitive equilib-
rium similar to Domeij and Klein (2005) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004).













that (1) given prices, ﬁscal policy and proﬁts, the household solves its maximiza-
tion problem, (2) given prices and ﬁscal policy, the ﬁrm solves its maximization





holds, (4) the government sets ﬁscal policy such that the government budget con-
straint is satisﬁed, (5) bond prices qt are determined by the no-arbitrage condition
1
qt = Rt+1 = 1 + (1   tk
t+1)(dt+1   d) and (6) proﬁts are zero in all periods, i.e.
fPt = 0g¥
t=0.
2.3 Calibration and Parameterization
I calibrate and parameterize the steady state of the competitive equilibrium to US
data from 1975 to 2005. Time is taken to be annual. In principle, there are two ways
to proceed.
First, estimate the model and use the estimation results to calibrate and parameterize
the model. This, however, turns out to be a thorny issue. Similar to Domeij and Klein
(2005), I have chosen a deterministic model. Hence, in order to estimate it with e.g.
recent Bayesian model estimation procedures, I would need to put the economy into
a stochastic environment with many shocks or by mechanically integrating measure-
ment errors. Further, I use a small-scale model without any nominal or real rigidities.
Estimating the model would potentially deliver biased or non-identiﬁed parame-
ter estimates since Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters
(2003), Mankiw and Reis (2006) and others have shown that additional features such
as sticky prices, sticky wages, sticky information, investment and capacity utiliza-
tion costs, limited participation etc. are important ingredients for a model in order
to explain macroeconomic time series behavior. These features, however, would com-
plicate the model considerably and simultaneously fog up the key issues this paper
attempts to address. Finally, in order to estimate the model, I would need to spec-
ify ﬁscal policy rules, e.g. how taxes or transfers adjust to changes in debt or other
9types of government expenditures in the competitive equilibrium. I believe, that the
particular choice of ﬁscal policy rules as well as their dynamic lead/lag pattern has
important effects for the resulting parameter estimates of the model. Due to these
reasons, I do not estimate the model. However, addressing these issues thoroughly
would be a useful next step on the research agenda and would certainly justify a
separate piece of research.
Instead, and in line with Domeij and Klein (2005), I calibrate the competitive equilib-
rium steady state to historical averages of data respectively parameterize the model
using standard parameter values used in the literature. Later on, I perform a sen-
sitivity analysis with respect to key parameters of the model. In particular, I set
¯ tc = 0.057, ¯ tn = 0.235 and ¯ tk = 0.514 as in Jonsson and Klein (2006). Further, I set ¯ g
and ¯ b such that ¯ g/¯ y = 0.162 and ¯ b/¯ y = 0.509 as in the data. Moreover, I ﬁx ¯ k and ¯ kg
such that ¯ k/¯ y = 2.6 and ¯ kg/¯ y = 0.6 correspond to the data as reported by Lansing
(1998).






t )1 s   1
1  s
. (5)
I set a = 0.323 to match ¯ n = 0.25 which corresponds to the estimate of McGrattan
and Rogerson (2004). Moreover, I set s = 1 which implies a unit intertemporal
elasticity of substitution with respect to private consumption which is in line with
e.g. Domeij and Klein (2005).
The parameter c pins down the marginal rate of substitution between private and
government consumption. Formally, MRSmodel
¯ g,¯ c =
u¯ g
u¯ c = c ¯ c
¯ g. I set c = 0.2443 to obtain
a marginal rate of substitution that is equal to 1. This choice is within the estimated
10two standard deviations range of the implied MRSdata
g,c 2 [0.86,1.73] in Amano and
Wirjanto (1998).1
I set the depreciation rates d = 0.0542 and dg = 0.0567 in order to match private and
public investment to GDP ratios in the data i.e. ¯ x/¯ y = 0.141 and ¯ xg/¯ y = 0.034.
Moreover, I ﬁx qk = 0.36 and qn = 0.64 which is in line with e.g. Gomme and Rupert
(2005) and Domeij and Klein (2005). Finally, I set qg = ¯ xg/¯ y = 0.034 as in Baxter and
King (1993).2 Tables 1 and 2 summarize my calibration and parameterization.
3 Optimal Pre-Announced Tax Reforms
In this section, I set up and analyze the optimal baseline as well as the “no con-
ﬁscation/subsidy” pre-announced capital and labor income tax reforms. For both
reforms, I also consider the cases when the government has no access to choose
government debt optimally.
3.1 Modeling Pre-Announcement
Similar to Domeij and Klein (2005), I assume that the Ramsey planner is benevolent
and has access to a commitment technology. The Ramsey planner credibly announces
in period t = 0 that from period T onwards there will be an optimal capital and
labor income tax reform. For the periods from t = 0,..,T   1 the government keeps
the capital and labor income tax at the competitive equilibrium steady states. I







. The estimated two standard deviations ranges for the parameters are
a 2 [0.494,0.778] and exp(m) 2 [0.431,0.571]. From the data I obtain ¯ c
¯ g = 4.06. These estimates result in
the range for the MRSdata
g,c given in the text.
2Note that this implies, as in Baxter and King (1993), that I have constant returns to scale for private
capital and hours worked while I have increasing returns to scale for private capital, hours worked and
public capital. I have also examined the consequences of imposing constant returns to scale for all three
factors. However, my conclusions later on with respect to the welfare implications appear to be robust to
this modiﬁcation.
11can translate this into the following pre-announcement constraints for the Ramsey
planner,3
tk
t = ¯ tk and tn
t = ¯ tn 8t = 0,..,T   1.
In order to obtain a non-trivial Ramsey problem in case of an immediate reform (T =
0), I follow Domeij and Klein (2005) and ﬁx the initial capital tax to its competitive
equilibrium steady state, i.e. tk
0 = ¯ tk for T = 0.4
3.2 Baseline Ramsey Reform
It is convenient for the formulation of the baseline Ramsey problem that the govern-
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where tax revenues are given by
Revt = tc
t ct + tn
t fn,tnt + tk
t (fk,t   d)kt 1. (7)
As Domeij and Klein (2005), I assume that the Ramsey planner takes government
transfers fstg¥
t=0 as a given stream of expenditures. In terms of taxes, I assume that




t=0 as in Domeij and Klein (2005) but takes consumption taxes ftc
t g¥
t=0 as
3In line with Domeij and Klein (2005) I assume that only capital and labor income taxes are ﬁxed
throughout the pre-announcement horizon. All other endogenous variables which the Ramsey planner
chooses in the next subsection are free to adjust already in the pre-announcement period.
4If the government would be free to choose tk
0 in case of an immediate reform (T = 0) it would
conﬁscate initial capital k 1 through an initial capital tax levy that is high enough to ﬁnance all future
government expenditures while simultaneously achieving zero future capital and labor income taxes.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) note on a standard immediate tax reform “To make the Ramsey problem
interesting, I always impose a restriction on tk
0”. In the literature there exist at least two approaches. Either
ﬁx tk
0 to a small or historical value as in Sargent and Ljungqvist or Domeij and Klein (2005) or impose an
upper bound for tk
0 as in Chamley (1986) or Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993). I examine the latter case in
one of the subsequent sections.
5I obtain this by repeated substitution of government bonds in consecutive government budget con-
straints. Further, I impose the transversality condition limt!¥ Õ
t
i=0 qibt = 0 and make use of the equilib-







i=0 qi which can be derived from the Euler equation for bonds.
12given.6 Similar to Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), I am now ready to deﬁne the
Ramsey problem.
Deﬁnition: Given the pre-announcement horizon T, initial capital and government
debt k 1,b 1 as well as consumption taxes and transfers ftc
t ,stg¥
t=0, the Ramsey prob-




In other words, the Ramsey planner maximizes household utility subject to the com-
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t   ¯ tn).
6As pointed out earlier, I have introduced consumption taxes since they are an important part of
government tax revenue in US data (see e.g. Trabandt and Uhlig (2006)) and thus helps me to realistically
calibrate the model. However, choosing capital, labor and consumption taxes simultaneously would imply
non-unique solutions since labor and consumption taxes affect the labor supply decision of the household
in the same way. That is, a high labor tax and a low consumption tax are equivalent to a low labor tax
and high consumption tax. Hence, I leave the consumption tax at its competitive equilibrium steady state
value and solve for the optimal labor and capital income taxes as in Domeij and Klein (2005).
7An alternative way to set up the Ramsey problem would be to apply the so-called primal approach, i.e.
using an implementability condition. However, for my particular Ramsey problem I ﬁnd the subsequent
approach which is also described by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) more suitable.
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t=0 if T  1. I assume that the Ramsey planner
takes k 1, b 1, tc
t and st at their competitive equilibrium steady states as given.
Finally, note that the multiplier ht on the Euler equation constraint becomes a state
variable. As discussed in Marcet and Marimon (1998), optimal policy decisions in
period t then depend on ht 1 with h 1 = 0.
Appendix A.1 summarizes the ﬁrst order optimality conditions for the Ramsey prob-
lem. I follow Domeij and Klein (2005) regarding the solution technique. Appendix
A.2 explains in detail how I solve the model.
3.2.1 Baseline Results
Table 3 provides a comparison of the data, the competitive equilibrium steady state
as well as the Ramsey steady states. Consider the column “Baseline” for the moment.
The Ramsey planner chooses a zero capital income tax in steady state which is in line
with the classical optimal taxation literature. Further, the Ramsey planner chooses
a higher private capital to output ratio but a lower public capital to output ratio.
It turns out that the public capital stock is lower in the Ramsey compared to the
competitive equilibrium steady state.8 Note that the private and public capital to
output ratios are independent of the pre-announcement horizon. This is because
the Ramsey planner always chooses a zero steady state capital income tax. Hence,
the real return on capital is not distorted in the steady state Ramsey equilibrium at
any pre-announcement horizon and thereby the optimal capital to output ratio is
unaffected by the pre-announcement horizon.
8This is due to the public capital share qg = 0.034. If I assume, e.g. qg = 0.05, the Ramsey planner
chooses a higher public capital stock than in the competitive equilibrium steady state. I examine the
implications of this in the sensitivity analysis.
14By contrast, the Ramsey steady state labor income tax rate is higher than in the com-
petitive equilibrium steady state. Furthermore, it increases with the
pre-announcement horizon. Front-loading of government debt decreases with pre-
announcement and lower receipts must be ﬁnanced by higher labor income taxes.
Finally, private and government consumption increase in the Ramsey steady state
but output increases by more so that the private and government consumption to
output ratios decrease relative to the competitive equilibrium steady state.
Figure 1 shows the transition of the key variables in response to the baseline op-
timal tax reform. In line with Domeij and Klein (2005) I observe that the initially
chosen capital income tax, the consumption boom and the front-loading of gov-
ernment debt reduces with the pre-announcement horizon. However, the Ramsey
planner also chooses government consumption and public capital in my model. The
ﬁgure reveals that government consumption is reduced initially before it smoothly
converges towards a higher level than in the competitive equilibrium steady state.
Interestingly, the transition path of government consumption is smooth throughout
all pre-announcement horizons and thus, the government contributes to smooth out
household utility.
On the other hand, the government chooses to reduce the public capital stock initially
before it converges upwards towards a lower steady state than in the competitive
equilibrium steady state. Hence, the existing competitive equilibrium steady state
public capital stock is inefﬁciently high and its reduction enhances efﬁciency since
distortionary labor taxes do not need to increase as much as with maintaining a high
public capital stock. The initial fall of public capital serves the following purpose.
The government uses these resources to reduce the amount of outstanding debt and
thereby the interest payments. Note that this occurs almost irrespective of the chosen
pre-announcement period. Since the household accumulates less government debt it
uses free resources to invest in the private capital stock which partly makes up for
the lower public capital stock.
15Figure 4 shows the welfare effects of the optimal pre-announced tax reform for differ-
ent pre-announcement horizons. I measure welfare in permanent private consump-
tion equivalents. See appendix A.3 for the details of these calculations. According
to the solid blue line in the upper panel of the ﬁgure the welfare gain of an immedi-
ate optimal tax reform corresponds to a permanent increase of private consumption
of 6.6 percent. By contrast, the welfare gain is 5 percent if the reform was pre-
announced 4 years in advance. Hence, pre-announcement leads to relative welfare
gain reductions of 24 percent in this baseline reform.
By contrast, as shown in ﬁgure 5, for a baseline optimal tax reform with ﬁxed and
non-valued government consumption and without public capital the welfare gains
amount to 5.3 percent (immediate) and 3.4 percent (4 years pre-announced). This
implies a relative reduction of welfare gains by roughly 36 percent similar to Domeij
and Klein (2005). Hence, for my baseline reform, valuable and productive govern-
ment spending - as employed in our model - leads to higher absolute welfare gains
and makes pre-announcement less costly in terms of relative welfare gain reductions.
The higher absolute welfare gain in my baseline reform is due to the efﬁciently
chosen levels of government consumption and public capital which lead to less dis-
tortions and hence higher welfare. The lower relative reduction of welfare gains
can be explained by two facts. First, the higher absolute level of welfare gains
reduces the relative costs of pre-announcement. Second, the government chooses
smooth pathes for government consumption and public capital irrespective of the
pre-announcement horizon and hence smoothes out the welfare effects. Thus, for
my baseline reform valuable and productive government spending leads to higher
absolute welfare gains and makes pre-announcement less costly in relative terms.
Hence, my results show that the welfare costs of pre-announcing an optimal tax re-
form are likely to be smaller than previously thought. Interestingly, the reduction
of welfare costs due to a more realistic description of the spending side of ﬁscal
policy are not dramatic. Nevertheless, they are economically signiﬁcant and there-
16fore, the effects of valuable and productive government spending should be taken
into account when beneﬁts and costs of an optimal pre-announced tax reform are
considered.
3.2.2 Sensitivity
My results depend of course on the valuation of government consumption by house-
holds c as well as on the public capital share in private production qg. For illustrative
purposes, we experiment with the following alternative values: qg 2 f0.005;0.1g and
c 2 f0.15;0.35g. I choose these particular values since each combination of these val-
ues represents the cases that either government consumption or public capital con-
verges to a higher and/or lower Ramsey steady state compared to the competitive
equilibrium steady state. Figure 5 shows that if either the valuation of government
consumption or the public capital share are low then pre-announcement is even less
costly than in my baseline optimal reform. Interestingly, if both the valuation of
government consumption and the public capital share are set to higher values then
pre-announcement can be almost as costly as in an economy without these ingredi-
ents.
In order to investigate this issue more thoroughly and to ensure further robustness
of my results, I proceed as follows. I construct many random parameter combina-
tions (qg,c) by drawing both parameters from the following uniform distributions:
qg  U[0.00001,0.2] and c  U[0.00001,0.6].9 I draw 329 parameter sets and solve
the baseline model for the following pre-announcement horizons T 2 f0,2,4g.10
The case of qg = 0.00001 resembles a non-productive government capital stock
which is similar to the standard Cobb-Douglas production function as in e.g. Coo-
ley and Prescott (1995). By contrast, qg = 0.2 corresponds to a comparably high
9I have chosen lower bounds of 0.00001 since the solution algorithm has difﬁculties to ﬁnd solutions if
the lower bound is strictly zero.
10It takes roughly one hour to solve the model for a given parameter combination and a given pre-
announcement horizon. Hence, total time for this analysis is 329 hours times 3 pre-announcement hori-
zons which amounts to roughly 5.5 weeks of total computation time. Thus, generating additional draws
respectively incorporating further pre-announcement horizons is extremely computationally burdensome.
17public capital share relative to my baseline speciﬁcation. However, this value is
still only half as large as the estimate in Aschauer (1989). To that end, we keep
the upper bound qg = 0.2 since my solution algorithm appears to be sensitive to
higher values of qg.11 Nevertheless, we consider the uniformly distributed interval
[0.00001,0.2] for qg as still reasonably large for a useful sensitivity analysis. The
uniformly distributed interval for c implies marginal rates of substitutions between
private and government consumption in the competitive equilibrium steady state of
MRSModel
¯ g,¯ c 2 (0.00004,2.45) which captures considerably more than the two standard
deviations range MRSdata
g,c 2 (0.86,1.73) of the empirical estimate reported in Amano
and Wirjanto (1998).
The upper left panel of ﬁgure 6 shows the random parameter combinations for qg and
c. The upper right panel shows the resulting welfare gains for each random parame-
ter combination. In addition, I add the results of our baseline parameterization (bold
black solid line) as well as the results of the model with non-valued and ﬁxed govern-
ment consumption and no productive public capital (bold black dashed line) similar
to Domeij and Klein (2005). In order to facilitate comparison with respect to the wel-
fare losses of pre-announcement, we normalize all welfare gains such that they equal
100 for T = 0. The ﬁgure shows that it is possible that 4 years pre-announcement is
almost costless in terms of relative welfare gain reductions. On the other hand, it is
also possible that 4 years pre-announcement is as costly as in the model that features
non-valued and ﬁxed government consumption and no productive public capital, i.e.
36 percent relative welfare gain reduction. However, the overwhelming majority of
cases is located somewhere in between theses two extremes. In particular, the mean
of the relative welfare gain reduction for 4 years pre-announcement is 20 percent.
Moreover, our baseline parameterization generates a relative welfare gain reduction
of 4 years pre-announcement of 24 percent which is located well within if not slightly
on the upper end of possible relative welfare gain reductions.
11In particular, values qg  0.2 imply that the Ramsey steady state of public capital is very far away
from its competitive equilibrium steady state level. In these cases, the solution algorithm appears to have
difﬁculties to calculate stable transition paths to the Ramsey steady state.
18The question that arises is which parameter combinations are responsible for these
results? The lower two panels of ﬁgure 6 examine the relative welfare gain reduc-
tions that are due from moving from T = 0 (immediate reform) to T = 4 (4 years
pre-announced reform) for all random parameter combinations and from different
angles. It appears that my baseline parameter combination (qg = 0.034,c = 0.2443)
generates a relative welfare gain reduction of roughly 24 percent whereas the pa-
rameter combination (qg = 0.071,c = 0.325) generates the maximum reduction of 36
percent. For the latter, both, government consumption and public capital converge
to Ramsey steady states that are higher than their competitive equilibrium counter-
parts. For this parameter combination, it turns out that the additional transitional
costs are as large as the additional steady state gains that arise from valuable and
productive government spending. In other words, the relative welfare gains are as
large as for the non-valued and constant government consumption and no public
capital model similar to Domeij and Klein (2005). For the overwhelming majority
of alternative parameter combinations, that is higher or lower values of qg and c,
the transitional costs are lower than the steady state gains which results in higher
relative welfare gains throughout all pre-announcement horizons.
To sum up, using empirically reasonable parameter intervals, it turns out that for
the overwhelming majority of cases pre-announcement is less costly than in an econ-
omy without valuable and productive government spending. From this, I conclude
that public goods and public capital are likely to reduce the welfare losses that are
associated with pre-announcement.
3.3 Baseline Ramsey Reform With Upper Bound On Capital
Taxes
The baseline optimal tax reform is characterized by initial capital income taxes much
higher than 100 percent. That is, capital income is conﬁscated entirely and moreover,
the household pays to rent out capital to the ﬁrms. By contrast, Chamley (1986) and
19Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993) analyze optimal immediate tax reforms with an
upper bound on capital taxes - say 100 percent. As a further extension to Domeij
and Klein (2005), I analyze the effects of imposing an upper bound of 100 percent
on capital taxes in my baseline optimal pre-announced tax reform. In this case, the
Ramsey planner faces the following additional constraint for the Ramsey problem in
section 3.2:
tk
t  1 8t = 0,..,¥. (8)
3.3.1 Baseline Results With Upper Bound On Capital Taxes
The column “Baseline (tk bound)” in table 3 shows the steady state characteristics
of this reform. The upper bound on capital taxes prevents the government from
accumulating an asset position as large as before. The loss in revenues is made
up for by higher labor income taxes. Figure 2 shows the transition of variables
for this reform. In case of immediate implementation (T=0) capital taxes hit the
upper bound for 5 periods before turning to zero fairly quickly afterwards. The
relatively prolonged period of 100 percent capital income taxes leads to a long lasting
consumption boom as opposed to the short lived consumption boom in the baseline
reform. It turns out that the longer the reform is pre-announced the smaller is the
amount of periods in which the capital tax hits the upper bound. The case of T=6 is
the ﬁrst time when the ﬁrst freely chosen capital tax is below 100 percent.
The upper panel of ﬁgure 4 shows the welfare gains of this reform. Again, an imme-
diate reform generates the highest welfare gains which are now 5.9 percent. How-
ever, the welfare gains are lower by roughly 0.7 percent compared to the baseline
optimal tax reform without upper bounds. In case the reform is pre-announced 4
years in advance welfare gains fall to 5 percent. Hence, relative welfare gains decline
by roughly 15 percent. However, one has to be careful by comparing this ﬁgure to
Domeij and Klein (2005) since they did not consider the case of an upper bound for
capital taxes. If anything, in my case it leads to a further reduction of the welfare
losses due to pre-announcement. Finally, note that as the pre-announcement horizon
20becomes sufﬁciently large, welfare gains coincide with the baseline optimal reform
since the upper bound constraint is not binding anymore.
3.4 “No conﬁscation/subsidy” Tax Reform
In this section, I focus on the question whether short-run properties of the opti-
mal pre-announced tax system are important for the resulting overall welfare gains.
More precisely, as we have seen in the previous sections, the baseline optimal tax
reform displays short-run conﬁscation and/or subsidy of capital and labor income
followed by a rather quick transition to the long-run values of taxes. How important
is this short-run deviation from the long-run taxes for the welfare consequences of
the reform? Put differently, how much of the welfare gains are attributable to the
initial conﬁscation and/or subsidy of capital and labor income and how much of
the welfare gains are due to the long-run constant tax rates? In order to answer
this question, I design a tax reform in which capital and labor income taxes move
- without conﬁscation and subsidy - directly to their endogenous long-run values
from the implementation date of the reform onwards. I call this reform “no conﬁs-
cation/subsidy” tax reform.12
This type of reform shares one dimension of one of the experiments in Chari, Chris-
tiano, and Kehoe (1994), Domeij and Klein (2005) and Dominguez (2006a). These
authors analyze the case when the government imposes a constant zero capital in-
come tax over time in case of an immediate reform. They show that welfare declines
compared to the case when the government conﬁscates capital through a high initial
capital income tax. In particular, Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994) report that 80
percent while Domeij and Klein (2005) report that 45 percent of the welfare gains are
due to the initial conﬁscation of capital income. However, these papers consider the
12Note that for short pre-announcement horizons conﬁscation of capital income occurs. As in Domeij
and Klein (2005), for very long pre-announcement horizons the initial capital income tax is negative and
hence a subsidy occurs. Finally, for immediate reforms, labor income taxes are initially negative which is
also a subsidy. The label “no conﬁscation/subsidy” is chosen since the reform avoids all these conﬁscation
and subsidy pattern.
21conﬁscation effects of this policy for an immediate reform only.13 Hence, my analysis
extends the existing literature in two dimensions. First, I analyze the importance of
conﬁscation and subsidy for the welfare properties of a pre-announced tax reform.
In addition, I consider the case that the government moves capital and labor taxes to
their endogenous long-run values at the implementation date of the tax reform.
The policy that capital and labor taxes move directly to their endogenous long-run
values in this alternative reform can be translated into the following additional con-
straints for the Ramsey planners problem in section 3.2,
tk
t = ¯ tk
n cs and tn
t = ¯ tn
n cs 8t = T,..,¥ (9)
where ¯ tk
n cs and ¯ tn
n cs denote the endogenously determined long-run steady state
values of capital and labor income taxes that correspond to the “no conﬁscation/subsidy”
reform. 14
3.4.1 Results “No conﬁscation/subsidy” Tax Reform
The column “no conﬁscation/subsidy” in table 3 shows the steady states of the pre-
announced tax reform with impact tax transitions. As for the baseline reform, the
optimal steady state capital income tax is zero and hence, I obtain the same private
and government capital to output ratios. Since the government cannot conﬁscate
capital through a high initial capital tax I observe less front-loading with respect to
government debt. In particular, for T = 0 the government can only attain a roughly
zero debt to output ratio and in order to cover expenditures a higher steady state
labor income tax is needed. By contrast, for T = 4 the government accumulates sur-
13Dominguez (2006a) assumes a one period implementation lag. However, she does not discuss welfare
implications in the presence of the zero capital income tax policy.
14These additional constraints for the Ramsey planner can be motivated alternatively by imposing time-
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¥. However, at
t = ¥ we are at the “no conﬁscation/subsidy” steady state and hence tk
¥ = ¯ tk





t+3 = ... = ¯ tk
n cs or alternatively tk
t = ¯ tk
n cs 8t = 0,..,¥. Finally, in the presence of
T pre-announcement periods I obtain the above constraint tk
t = ¯ tk
n cs 8t = T,..,¥. The case of labor taxes
follows accordingly.
22pluses and reaches a negative debt position that generates interest revenues. Hence,
the steady state labor income tax is lower than for T = 0. Note that this is exactly the
opposite effect compared to the baseline optimal reform. Now, pre-announcement
leads to less distortions in steady state for this type of tax reform. The private and
government consumption to output ratios change only very little. Finally, labor sup-
ply and output in steady state increase with pre-announcement as opposed to the
baseline optimal reform.
Figure 3 shows the transition of variables for the
“no conﬁscation/subsidy” tax reform. Interestingly, the government prefers again
a smooth pattern of government consumption and public capital even for different
pre - announcement horizons. By contrast again, the transition of government debt
depends much more on the pre-announcement length. The government accumulates
only a net asset position if the pre-announcement horizon is sufﬁciently large. There
is no initial consumption boom since there is no longer any initial conﬁscation of
capital. An immediate reform moves the capital income tax to zero in the initial pe-
riod which induces a large increase in the real return on capital. In order to expand
the private capital stock the individual reduces consumption by a relatively large
amount. By contrast, if the reform is pre-announced consumption declines by less
since in anticipation of the reform, the capital stock increases smoothly over time in
the pre-announcement periods.
Figure 4 depicts the welfare effects of pre-announcement for the
“no conﬁscation/subsidy” tax reform. The solid red line with squares shows that
the welfare gains from pre-announcement increase with the pre-announcement hori-
zon. The upper panel shows that an immediate reform implies 3.5 percent higher
permanent private consumption whereas a 4 years pre-announced reform delivers
234.7 percent higher permanent private consumption.15 Hence, relative welfare gains
increase by roughly 35 percent.
This is due to the following reason. In case of an immediate reform, the government
is not able to initially choose very high capital taxes and negative labor taxes. The
absence of the capital conﬁscation implies that the government cannot accumulate a
net-asset position in steady state and hence a higher steady state labor income tax is
needed to generate enough tax revenues to balance the government budget. Hence,
higher distortions imply low welfare gains. Consider the case of pre-announcement.
Now, the government can accumulate a net-asset position because tax revenues rise
in the pre-announcement period due to higher labor supply and capital accumula-
tion. A steady state net-asset position implies lower steady state labor income taxes
and therefore lower distortions. This in turn results in larger welfare gains for the
pre-announced tax reform.16
Moreover, notice that there are rather large differences between the level of welfare
gains of the optimal baseline and the “no conﬁscation/subsidy” tax reform in case of
an immediate implementation. These differences become very small if the reforms
are pre-announced 4 years in advance. However, and more importantly, although
the level of welfare gains appear to be rather similar in both reforms the structure
of taxes is rather different. For 4 years pre-announcement, the ﬁrst freely chosen
capital tax in the baseline optimal tax reform is still 178 percent. By contrast, the
“no conﬁscation/subsidy” reform moves straight to zero percent capital taxes. The
resulting loss of revenues in the “no conﬁscation/subsidy” reform is made up for by
15Note that my results for the immediate reform are in line with the existing literature. As pointed
my earlier, Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994) ﬁnd that 80 percent of the welfare gains of an immediate
optimal reform are due to conﬁscation of capital income. Domeij and Klein (2005) report that 45 percent
of the welfare gains are due to high initial capital taxes. I ﬁnd that removing conﬁscation and subsidy of
capital and labor taxes reduces the welfare gains from 6.6 percent to 3.5 percent and hence by 53 percent
in an immediate reform. However, the literature does only examine these effects for immediate reforms
while I take a further step ahead by analyzing how pre-announcement affects these results.
16Technically, pre-announcement reduces the immediate tax transition constraints and hence the gov-
ernment has more degrees of freedom. However, for very long pre-announcement periods, the gains from
pre-announcement may be out-weighted by the delay effect since households discount the future.
24moderately higher steady state labor taxes of 30 percent compared to 28 percent in
the baseline optimal tax reform.
To sum up, I have analyzed a tax reform in which the government moves taxes -
without conﬁscation and subsidy - directly to their endogenous long-run values. For
this reform, I observe that the welfare gains - though the absolute level is lower com-
pared to the baseline optimal reform - increase with the pre-announcement horizon.
Further, I show that the level of welfare gains is very similar to those of an optimal
4 years pre-announced reform. Hence, my analysis indicates that conﬁscation and
subsidy of capital and labor income are not important for the level of welfare gains
that arise from an optimal tax reform which is sufﬁciently pre-announced in advance
of its implementation.
3.5 Pre-Announced Tax Reforms With Fixed Debt
In the previous sections, we have seen that the transition path of public capital and
government consumption is smooth despite different pre-announcement periods. By
contrast, the pattern of government debt changed a lot with the pre-announcement
horizon. Moreover, in many of the cases that I have considered the government ac-
cumulates a net asset position. Although this is a standard result in the optimal
taxation literature with immediate implementation it is not a typical observation in
the data. A natural question to ask is therefore: what happens to the results if we
assume that the government has no access to government debt? That is, the gov-
ernment leaves the existing stock of government debt untouched at its competitive
equilibrium steady state. In order to capture this variation formally, I impose
bt = ¯ b 8t = 0,..,¥. (10)
Technically, the intertemporal government budget constraint in section 3.2 is replaced
by its period-by-period version. In addition, I impose the constant debt requirement
25as well as the no-arbitrage condition which results in the following period-by-period
government budget constraint for the Ramsey planner,
gt + st + k
g
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  d)) 1   1)¯ b. (11)
I study the effects of the ﬁxed debt assumption for the baseline as well as for the “no
conﬁscation/subsidy” tax reform.
3.5.1 Results Fixed Debt Reforms
Consider the column “Baseline/No conf-subsidy (Fixed Debt)” in table 3 now. Both
reforms result in the same steady state since debt is not available as a policy instru-
ment for the government. For the same reason, the steady states of the variables do
not depend on the pre-announcement horizon anymore. Again, the optimal steady
state capital income tax is zero which delivers the same private and public capital
to output ratios as before. The absence of government debt as an instrument for the
government implies that labor taxes are higher compared to the previous reforms.
The debt to output ratio falls because output rises. Note however, that the increase
of output is the lowest for all reforms.
Figures 7 and 8 show the transition of variables in response to the tax reforms.17
And indeed, if government debt is ﬁxed, the transition pathes of public capital and
government consumption are not as smooth as before and depend much more on the
pre-announcement horizon. Under ﬁxed debt, the Ramsey planner allocates the rev-
enues from immediate or pre-announced taxation between government consumption
17I do not report results when an upper bound on capital taxes is imposed. The upper bound only
binds for T = 0 and then only for two periods. The changes in allocations are only minimal. Further, the
changes in welfare gains are almost indistinguishable for T = 0 and identical to the baseline reform with
ﬁxed debt for T  1. These results make sense since the tk
0 = ¯ tk constraint for T = 0 is replaced by the
constraint tk
0  1 which is active for two periods only. Hence, the allocations and welfare gains are rather
similar to the baseline reform with ﬁxed debt and due to this I do not report them here.
26and public capital which in turn affects the transition of e.g. private consumption,
hours and private capital.
Figure 9 shows the welfare effects for the baseline (dashed-dotted) as well as “no
conﬁscation/subsidy” (dashed-dotted/squares) tax reform under the ﬁxed govern-
ment debt requirement. Two things are noticeable. First, both curves are below the
ones that allow for variable debt. If the government has no access to government
debt this reduces the set of its instruments and hence the beneﬁts of an optimal re-
form will be lower. Second, the “no conﬁscation/subsidy” tax reform with ﬁxed
debt also generates increases of welfare gains in the presence of pre-announcement.
However, longer pre-announcement horizons are needed to obtain almost the same
welfare gains as in the baseline reform with ﬁxed debt. Nevertheless, my result that
pre-announcement increases welfare gains in case of the “no conﬁscation/subsidy”
tax reform prevails qualitatively even if the government has no access to government
debt.
4 Discussion of Related Literature
Optimal taxation in a standard neoclassical growth model using a normative ap-
proach proposed by Ramsey (1927) is studied by many authors, see e.g. Chamley
(1986), Judd (1985a), Lucas (1990), Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994), Atkeson,
Chari, and Kehoe (1999), Chari and Kehoe (1999) and Erosa and Gervais (2001). Typ-
ical results of this literature are the optimal zero steady state capital income tax as
well as sizable welfare gains from the tax reform. However, common to this liter-
ature is that it analyzes optimal taxation with immediate implementation only and
therefore abstracts from pre-announcement effects.
By contrast, Domeij and Klein (2005) investigate an optimal pre-announced labor
and capital income tax reform in a standard neoclassical growth model. The au-
thors show that the welfare gains of an optimal capital and labor tax reform de-
27cline the longer the reform is pre-announced before its implementation. Hence, pre-
announcement is costly in terms of welfare. Domeij and Klein (2005) argue that the
incentive effects of the future anticipated tax reform are dominated by the time delay
effect and therefore ﬁscal policy should not pre-announce this type of tax reform.
In line with the classical optimal taxation literature, Domeij and Klein (2005) use a
neoclassical growth model in which the ﬁscal authority collects distortionary taxes.
However, Domeij and Klein (2005) assume that government consumption is constant
and not valued by households and there does not exist a variable and productive
government capital stock. By contrast, I examine the importance of valuable and
productive government spending for the resulting welfare gains of pre-announced
tax reforms.
Aiyagari (1995) examines optimal capital income taxation in an economy with in-
complete insurance markets and borrowing constraints. He shows that in such an
environment the optimal capital income tax rate is positive in the short- and long-
run. Due to uninsurable, idiosyncratic risk, individuals accumulate too much capital
because of precautionary savings motives. A positive capital income tax reduces the
capital stock to its optimal level. By contrast, the present paper assumes homoge-
nous agents that face no borrowing constraints as in Domeij and Klein (2005) and
therefore, the optimal long-run capital income tax will be zero in my model.
Lansing (1998) studies optimal ﬁscal policy in a business cycle model that features
utility providing public consumption and public capital. He employs a stochastic
model in order to analyze optimal ﬁscal policy responses to technology and pref-
erence shocks. Lansing (1998) analyzes approximated local dynamics but does not
consider transitional dynamics of the underlying optimal tax reform. Cassou and
Lansing (2006) study the effects of tax reforms with useful public expenditures in an
endogenous growth model. In their model, public expenditures contribute to human
capital formation as well provide utility. The authors compare the effects of optimal
tax reforms with sub-optimal revenue-neutral tax reforms. However, both papers
28assume that ﬁscal policies are implemented immediately and do not consider effects
from pre-announcement.
Baxter and King (1993) were one of the ﬁrst authors who analyzed the effects of ﬁscal
policy in a neoclassical growth model with productive government capital and utility
providing government consumption. McGrattan (1994) analyzes the macroeconomic
effects of distortionary taxation in a neoclassical growth model in which household
utility depends on government spending. Further, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)
assume that government consumption affects household utility and show that this
has important consequences for aggregate labor market ﬂuctuations. However, these
papers make no reference to pre-announcement.
Judd (1985b) shows in a representative agent model that anticipated future invest-
ment tax credits may depress current investment. Further, he shows that an imme-
diate income tax cut that is ﬁnanced by future cuts in government expenditures also
depresses current investment. Judd (1987b,a) analyzes the welfare costs of unantici-
pated and anticipated tax changes. He ﬁnds that delay increases the excess burden
of capital taxation while it reduces the excess burden for wage taxation. Further, an
investment tax credit at a future point in time always dominates a capital income
tax cut at that time. However, these papers do not analyze optimally chosen tax
rates in the presence of delay. Further, Judd abstracts from valuable and productive
government spending.
The present paper analyzes the short-run slopes of the US and
EU-15 Laffer curves for immediate and pre-announced labor and capital tax cuts. It
is shown that the short-run dynamics can be very different depending on the timing
of tax cuts. House and Shapiro (2006) investigate the aggregate effects of the timing
of tax rate changes in a case study for the 2001 and 2003 US tax law changes. They
ﬁnd that economic growth increased by 0.9 percent once the 2003 law eliminated the
pre-announcement structure of the 2001 law. However, these two contributions do
not derive optimal tax reforms nor they consider welfare issues. House and Shapiro
29(2006), however, conjecture in footnote 1 that “Because it is often optimal to tax the
initial capital stock heavily, the optimal tax rate on capital income should be phased-
in”. In terms of welfare, Domeij and Klein (2005) as well as this paper show that the
baseline optimal tax reform with immediate implementation (no phase-in) generates
the highest gains. Hence, the optimal baseline tax reform should not be phased-in.
However, my “no conﬁscation/subsidy” reform shows indeed that optimal tax rates
should be implemented with pre-announcement (or should be phased-in) since for
this type of reform welfare gains increase with pre-announcement.
Recently, Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2004) study the optimal choice of utility pro-
viding government expenditures when the government cannot commit to future
policies. By contrast, the present paper assumes that the government can commit
to future government expenditures. In addition, the paper by Klein, Krusell, and
Rios-Rull (2004) considers immediately implemented reforms only.
Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2004) analyze the optimal timing of cap-
ital income taxes when capital depreciation is not constant. The authors ﬁnd that
under commitment the optimal time pattern of capital taxes is oscillating whereas
optimal capital taxes are smooth without commitment. However, although the paper
considers a one period implementation lag of optimal capital taxes, pre-announcement
of more periods is not considered. In addition, the paper abstracts from utility pro-
viding government consumption as well as from productive government capital.
Dominguez (2006a) analyzes the time-inconsistency of optimal capital income taxes
in an economy without full commitment. She studies optimal capital and labor
income taxation in a neoclassical growth model with debt restructuring and an insti-
tutional delay of capital tax changes of one year. Referring to the terminology that
is used in the present paper, the institutional delay can also be interpreted as a one
year pre-announcement of a capital tax change. Dominguez (2006a) ﬁnds that debt
restructuring together with the institutional delay enforces commitment of the gov-
ernment to the optimal tax reform. Put differently, without full commitment, debt
30restructuring and institutional delay can improve welfare. The author concludes that
the time-inconsistency problem of optimal capital taxes is not as severe as previously
thought since decision making in democratic societies is characterized by institu-
tional delays. However, my paper abstracts from debt restructuring policies and
assumes that the Ramsey planner can commit to future policies.
Klein and Rios-Rull (2003) examine optimal ﬁscal policy when the government has no
access to commitment. The authors study the properties of Markov perfect equilibria
in an economy with a one period implementation lag for capital taxes but without
government debt. Klein and Rios-Rull (2003) show that optimal time-consistent cap-
ital taxes are different from zero. Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) explore optimal
capital taxes in an environment without commitment, without government debt and
without implementation lags. They ﬁnd that capital taxes are likely to be different
from zero in the long-run. Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) analyze the set of sustainable
equilibria in an economy without commitment and without government debt and
report that optimal capital taxes may be different from zero in the steady state. Re-
cently, Dominguez (2006b) has shown that these results are sensitive to whether the
government has access to government debt. In particular, as soon as the government
can issue debt and smooth taxes over time, it appears that optimal long-run capital
taxes are zero.
Eichengreen (1990) analyzes conﬁscation of capital income in theory and practice.
Using a highly stylized theoretical model, he argues that a capital levy which is sub-
ject to an institutional delay induces capital owners to move their assets abroad. Due
to the capital ﬂight the capital levy as such is likely to be abolished at the date of
implementation. Eichengreen (1990) examines historical cross-country evidence with
respect to capital levies and concludes that capital ﬂight in conjunction with institu-
tional delays are the reasons for unsuccessful capital levies in practice. By contrast,
the present paper examines pre-announced capital levies in a closed economy. In
line with Domeij and Klein (2005), we ﬁnd that the size of the optimal initial capital
levy decreases with the pre-announcement horizon. Capital cannot move abroad in
31our model as it is the case in Eichengreen (1990). However, I observe nevertheless
a similar effect. In my model, individuals decide to accumulate less capital if they
expect a levy in the future which in turn induces the Ramsey planner to choose a
lower levy. In addition, and more importantly, my “no conﬁscation/subsidy” reform
shows that capital levies as such are not important for the resulting welfare gains of
an optimal pre-announced reform.
My “no conﬁscation/subsidy” reform shares one dimension of one of the reform
experiments in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994), Domeij and Klein (2005) and
Dominguez (2006a). These authors analyze the case when the government imposes a
constant zero capital income tax over time in case of an immediate reform.18 I depart
from this work in two dimensions. First, we analyze the effects of pre-announcement
for the resulting welfare gains of this type of tax reform. Second, I analyze the effects
when the government moves capital and labor taxes to their endogenous long-run
values at the implementation date of the reform.
This paper employs the normative approach proposed by Ramsey (1927) in order to
determine optimal ﬁscal policy. The Ramsey planner is assumed to be able to choose
linear distortionary taxes optimally but cannot choose lump-sum taxes. Moreover,
most of the literature assumes that there is no heterogeneity across individuals. The
Ramsey literature arrives at the result that savings decisions shall not be distorted in
the long-run and hence capital income taxes are zero in the steady state. By contrast,
Mirrlees (1971) proposed an alternative approach. He explores a model in which
agents have private information about their stochastic individual skills. The Mirrlees
approach aims at designing a tax system that provides insurance for skill risk on
the one hand and incentives for more production of high skilled agents on the other
hand. The resulting optimal tax schedule is non-linear in the sense that there are
no distortions for high skilled agents but distortionary taxes for low skilled agents.
Insurance is then provided via lump-sum redistribution.
18Dominguez (2006a) assumes a one period implementation lag. However, she does not discuss welfare
implications in the presence of the zero capital income tax policy.
32Recently, the New Dynamic Public Finance literature puts the Mirrlees approach into
a dynamic context. Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning (2006) as well as Kocherlakota
(2006) provide excellent and comprehensive surveys that summarize the growing
body of work of that literature. Outstanding papers by Albanesi and Sleet (2006),
Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinsky (2003) as well as Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006)
have shown that it is optimal to distort the savings decisions of individuals if skills
change stochastically over time. Kocherlakota (2005) shows that in an environment
with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks the expected individual wealth tax rate is
zero. More importantly, he shows that the government never collects net revenues
from wealth taxes. In other words, the dynamic Mirrlees approach in Kocherlakota
(2005) generates an optimal aggregate capital income tax rate that is zero in all peri-
ods. Interestingly, this result is similar to the long-run zero aggregate capital income
tax result suggested by the Ramsey approach.
However, I am not aware of work that has been done in the New Dynamic Public
Finance literature which examines the effects of pre-announcement respectively the
effects of valuable and productive government spending. Examining these features
within this literature would certainly be a useful next step on the research agenda.
To that end, however, I rely on the Ramsey approach in since it is particulary useful
for my question. First, the paper represents an extension to the work of Domeij and
Klein (2005) who themselves apply the Ramsey approach in their analysis. Hence,
in order to facilitate comparison, I also choose the Ramsey approach. Second, I aim
to access the importance of short-run conﬁscation and subsidy of capital and labor
income in the presence of pre-announcement in the Ramsey approach.
In the present paper, the benevolent Ramsey planner undertakes an optimal pre-
announced tax reform in which he also chooses optimal levels of valuable and
productive government spending. Hence, the Ramsey planner determines the op-
timal size of the government in my economy given preferences and technology. By
contrast, Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) explore a model with heterogenous agents in
which majority voting determines policies. The political economy paradigm enables
33the authors to analyze how different policy selection procedures and collective choice
mechanisms affect taxes and the size of the government. As a result, their political
economy model predicts e.g. a size of transfers that is consistent with US data.
For further prominent contributions on political economy implications for economic
policies, see e.g. Alesina and Rodik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Krusell
and Rios-Rull (1996), Krusell, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1996, 1997), Hassler, Krusell,
Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2005) and Hassler, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003, 2006).
However, political economy considerations are beyond the scope of this paper. In-
stead, I regard my work as an extension to Domeij and Klein (2005) by examining
the welfare effects of pre-announced tax reforms when the Ramsey planner chooses
optimal levels of valuable and productive government spending that are consistent
with preferences and technology. I believe, that reexamining my work from a po-
litical economy perspective might be an interesting next step. However, I leave this
issue to future research.
To sum up, the contribution of the present paper to the literature is twofold. First, I
reexamine Domeij and Klein (2005) by taking two additional features of government
spending explicitly into account: public goods and public capital. In other words,
I examine the welfare consequences of utility providing government consumption
and productive government capital in a pre-announced optimal tax reform. Second,
I analyze how important the short-run properties of the optimal tax system - in other
words conﬁscation and/or subsidy of capital and labor income - are for the resulting
overall welfare gains of the pre-announced tax reform.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the following question: should ﬁscal policy pre-announce
tax reforms before their implementation from a welfare point of view? Domeij and
Klein (2005) show that the welfare gains of an optimal capital and labor tax reform
decline the longer the reform is pre-announced before its implementation. Hence,
34pre-announcement is costly in terms of welfare. I have reexamined the claim of
Domeij and Klein (2005) by taking two additional features of government spending
explicitly into account: public goods and public capital.
In my baseline optimal tax reform I ﬁnd that valuable and productive government
spending leads to higher absolute welfare gains and makes pre-
announcement less costly in terms of relative welfare gain reductions due to pre-
announcement. More precisely, a 4 years pre-announced reform reduces relative
welfare gains compared to an immediate reform by roughly 24 percent in the pres-
ence of valuable and productive government spending. By contrast, the relative loss
is roughly 36 percent in an economy without valuable and productive government
spending. In addition, a sensitivity analysis based on empirically reasonable param-
eter estimates reveals that for the overwhelming majority of parameter combinations
pre-announcement is less costly than in an economy without valuable and produc-
tive government spending. Hence, I conclude that public goods and public capital
are likely to reduce the welfare losses that are associated with pre-announcement.
Thus, my results show that the welfare costs of pre-announcing an optimal tax re-
form are likely to be smaller than previously thought. Interestingly, the reduction
of welfare costs due to a more realistic description of the spending side of ﬁscal
policy are not dramatic. Nevertheless, they are economically signiﬁcant and there-
fore, the effects of valuable and productive government spending should be taken
into account when beneﬁts and costs of an optimal pre-announced tax reform are
considered.
The second contribution of this paper focuses on the question whether short-run
properties of the optimal pre-announced tax system are important for the resulting
overall welfare gains. The baseline optimal tax reform is characterized by initial
conﬁscation and/or subsidy of capital and labor income via taxation followed by
a rather quick transition to the long-run values of taxes. In order to evaluate the
importance of this short-run conﬁscation and/or subsidy for the resulting welfare
35gains, I design a tax reform in which capital and labor income taxes move - without
conﬁscation and subsidy - directly to their endogenous long-run values from the
implementation date of the reform onwards.
Interestingly, I show that welfare gains for this “no conﬁscation/subsidy” tax reform
increase with the pre-announcement horizon as opposed to the decrease observed in
the baseline optimal pre-announced reform. In particular, I ﬁnd that relative welfare
gains increase by roughly 35 percent if the tax reform is pre-announced 4 years in
advance. Moreover, I show that the level of welfare gains is very different for the
baseline optimal and the “no conﬁscation/subsidy” reform in case of immediate
implementation. By contrast, the level of welfare gains becomes very similar for 4
years pre-announcement. Despite this, however, the underlying structure of taxes in
both reforms appears still to be very different. For 4 years pre-announcement, the
ﬁrst freely chosen capital tax in the baseline optimal tax reform is still 178 percent.
By contrast, the “no conﬁscation/subsidy” reform moves straight to zero percent
capital taxes. The resulting loss of revenues in the “no conﬁscation/subsidy” reform
is made up for by moving to moderately higher steady state labor taxes of 30 percent
compared to 28 percent in the baseline optimal tax reform.
Therefore, my results indicate that conﬁscation and subsidy of capital and labor
income are not important for the level of welfare gains that arise from an optimal
tax reform which is sufﬁciently pre-announced in advance of its implementation.
Finally, I show that my results prevail qualitatively even if the government has no
access to government debt.
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Table 1: Calibration of the Competitive Equilibrium Steady State
Variable Value Description Restriction
¯ tn 0.235 Labor tax rate Data
¯ tk 0.514 Capital tax rate Data
¯ tc 0.057 Consumption tax rate Data
¯ g/¯ y 0.162 Government consumption to output ratio Data
¯ b/¯ y 0.509 Government debt to output ratio Data
¯ k/¯ y 2.6 Private capital to output ratio Data
¯ kg/¯ y 0.6 Public capital to output ratio Data
41Table 2: Parameterizing the Competitive Equilibrium Steady State
Variable Value Description Restriction
a 0.323 Priv. consumption weight in utility ¯ n = 0.25
c 0.2443 Det. weight of gov. cons. in utility
u¯ g
u¯ c = 1
s 1.00 Det. intertemp. elast. of subst.   u¯ c
u¯ c¯ c¯ c = 1
qk 0.36 Private capital share on production Data
qn 0.64 Labor share on production Data
qg 0.034 Public capital share on production Data
d 0.0542 Depreciation rate of private capital Data





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Figure 1: Baseline Tax Reform
Notes: Baseline tax reform for different pre-announcement periods. (horizontal line: competitive
equilibrium steady state).
44Figure 2: Baseline Tax Reform with Upper Bound on Capital Taxes
Notes: Baseline tax reform with upper bound on capital taxes for different pre-announcement
periods. (horizontal line: competitive equilibrium steady state).
45Figure 3: “No conﬁscation/subsidy” Tax Reform
Notes: “No conﬁscation/subsidy” tax reform for different pre-announcement periods. (horizontal
line: competitive equilibrium steady state).
46Figure 4: Welfare Gains and Taxes of Baseline and “no conﬁscation/subsidy” Tax Re-
forms
Notes: The upper panel plots welfare gains measured in permanent increases of private consump-
tion for the baseline tax reform, the baseline tax reform with an upper bound on capital taxes as
well as for the “no conﬁscation/subsidy” tax reform. In the latter reform, the government moves
taxes - without conﬁscation and subsidy - directly to the endogenous long-run taxes from the
implementation date onwards. The lower left panel depicts the transition of capital taxes whereas
the lower right panel plots the transition of labor taxes in case of 4 years pre-announcement for
all three reforms. While welfare is rather similar for T=4 in all three reforms, the tax structure
appears to be very different.
47Figure 5: Sensitivity Analysis
Notes: Sensitivity analysis. The upper panel plots the level of welfare gains as well as the normal-
ized welfare gains (T=0 equals 100) for the baseline tax reform for different pre-announcement
periods and different parameters c and qg. “No Val. & Prod. Gov. Spending” corresponds to the
model with no valuation and ﬁxed government consumption and no productive public capital.
The mid panel plots government consumption and the lower panel plots public capital for T=0
and T=4. The horizontal lines in the mid and lower panel are the competitive equilibrium steady
states.
48Figure 6: Sensitivity Analysis: Random Parameter Draws
Notes: The upper left panel shows random parameter combinations of qg and c that result from
drawing both parameters from the following uniform distributions: qg  U[0.00001,0.2] and
c  U[0.00001,0.6]. Total number of draws: 329. The upper right panel shows the resulting wel-
fare gains for each random parameter combination for pre-announcement horizons T 2 f0,2,4g.
The bold black solid line shows my baseline parameterization and the bold black dashed line rep-
resents the model with non-valued and ﬁxed government consumption and no productive public
capital. In order to facilitate comparison with respect to the welfare losses of pre-announcement,
we normalize all welfare gains such that they equal 100 for T = 0. Finally, the lower two panels
depict the reductions of relative welfare gains that are due to moving from T = 0 (immediate
reform) to T = 4 (4 years pre-announced reform) for all random parameter combinations and
from different angles.
49Figure 7: Baseline Tax Reform with Fixed Debt
Notes: Baseline tax reform with ﬁxed debt and different pre-announcement periods. (horizontal
line: competitive equilibrium steady state).
50Figure 8: “No conﬁscation/subsidy” Tax Reform with Fixed Debt
Notes: “No conﬁscation/subsidy” tax reform with ﬁxed debt and different pre-announcement
periods. (horizontal line: competitive equilibrium steady state).
51Figure 9: Welfare Gains of Tax Reforms with and without Fixed Debt
Notes: The upper panel plots welfare gains measured in permanent increases of private consump-
tion for the baseline tax reform, the baseline tax reform with an upper bound on capital taxes as
well as for the “No conﬁscation/subsidy” tax reform. Further, the plot also depicts welfare gains
of the baseline optimal tax reform as well as the “no conﬁscation/subsidy” tax reform with ﬁxed
government debt. The lower panel plots the corresponding welfare gains where I have normalized
consumption equivalents to 100 for T = 0 in all reforms that I consider.
52A Appendix
A.1 Ramsey Problem - First Order Conditions
A.1.1 First order conditions for periods t > T (if T = 0) or t  T (if T  1):
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54A.1.2 First order conditions for periods 1  t  T   1:
ct, gt,nt,kt,Revt,k
g
t,ht,mt,gt,wt,f: equations (12) to (17) as well as equations (20) to
(24). In addition, the following ﬁrst order conditions need to be changed to
tk
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t ,nt,kt: equations (15) to (17) as well as equations (20)
to (24) and equations (25) to (28). Now, the following ﬁrst order conditions need to
be adjusted:
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t : equations (29) to (31), equations (15) to (17),
equation (19) and equations (20) to (24).
Note that the Ramsey planner does not choose tk
0 here in order to avoid the initial
conﬁscation. Instead, for this case, I directly impose tk
0 = ¯ tk in all equations listed
above.
A.2 Solution Method for the Ramsey Model
I follow Domeij and Klein (2005) regarding the solution technique.19 In particular, I
make the system of equations derived in appendix A.1 ﬁnite dimensional by assum-
ing that the economy converges to the Ramsey steady state in ﬁnitely many periods.
19I use MATLAB to solve the model. However, I am thankful to Paul Klein for sending example GAUSS
code of the numerical solution technique used in Domeij and Klein (2005).
56To that end, I choose 100 years as the ﬁnite time horizon. This implies that if time
starts in t = 0 I know the terminal values of our state variables in period t = 99, i.e.
k99 = ¯ kRamsey, k
g
99 = ¯ k
g
Ramsey and h99 = ¯ hRamsey.
In addition, since the economy reaches the Ramsey steady state at latest in the termi-
nal period the three Euler equations for the terminal period t = 99 that look forward
to the period t = 100 in the system of equations derived in the appendix A.1 are not
longer required. This leaves me with a system of non-linear equations with as many
equations as unknowns which I can solve with non-linear numerical solver.
In particular, using the derivations of appendix A.1 for, e.g. T = 0, I guess a value for








t=0 knowing that k99 = ¯ kRamsey,
k
g
99 = ¯ k
g
Ramsey and h99 = ¯ hRamsey. Hence, I have 8  100 + 1  99 + 3  99=1196 un-
known variables. Given f, appendix A.1 shows that for T = 0 in period 0 there
are 11 equations and for periods t = 1,..,99 there are 12 equations that determine
the equilibrium. Thus, 12  99 + 11 minus the three Euler equations for the ter-
minal period gives exactly 1196 equations. The case of T > 0 applies accordingly.
I solve the system of non-linear equations using the fsolve.m function of MATLAB
with a solution precision of 1e   8. Technically, given the guess for the multiplier f,
I am able to calculate the Ramsey steady state which in turn serves as an initial guess,
f¯ cRamsey, ¯ nRamsey, ¯ gRamsey, ¯ RevRamsey, ¯ tn




t=1, f¯ kRamsey, ¯ k
g
Ramsey, ¯ hRamseyg98
t=0, for the above sequences of variables I wish
to solve for.
Having obtained a potential solution, I check whether the intertemporal government
budget constraint is satisﬁed with a precision of 1e   6. If not, I update f and
repeat calculations until the desired solution precision is achieved. For a given pre-
announcement horizon T it takes roughly one hour to solve the model with an up-
to-date unix machine.
57In order to check whether my solution represents the global maximum, I have done
the following diagnostic checks. First, we have randomized my initial guess for
the multiplier f. In particular, I have drawn f from a uniform distribution on
the interval [0,3].20 Consider the case of e.g. T = 0. Due to random draws for
f, the Ramsey steady states are randomized as well and hence the initial guess
f¯ cRamsey, ¯ nRamsey, ¯ gRamsey, ¯ RevRamsey, ¯ tn




t=1, f¯ kRamsey, ¯ k
g
Ramsey, ¯ hRamseyg98








t=0 we wish to solve for is ran-
domized as well. The case of T > 0 applies accordingly. Given that the solution
algorithm was able to ﬁnd a solution, I always obtained the solution for the baseline
and “no conﬁscation/subsidy” reforms discussed in the paper.
Second, as a further check that my solution represents the global maximum I draw
the multiplier f from a uniform distribution on the interval [0,3] and in addition per-
turb my initial guesses for the sequences of variables. In particular, I generate e.g.
f¯ crand = ¯ cRamsey eg99
t=0 where e is drawn form a uniform distribution on the interval
[0.5,1.5].21 Similarly, I perturb the other variables using alternative and independent
draws for e and formulate the following initial guess for the sequences of variables I
wish to solve for:
f¯ crand, ¯ nrand, ¯ grand, ¯ Revrand, ¯ tn




f¯ krand, ¯ k
g
rand, ¯ hrandg98
t=0 for T = 0. The case of T > 0 applies accordingly. Hence,
this way, I have randomized our initial guess in two dimensions. First, the un-
derlying Ramsey steady state is randomized by random draws of f. Second, our
initial guess for the sequences of variables itself consists now of random elements
that are unrelated to e.g. the Ramsey steady state. Hence, I argue that my initial
20In most of the solutions discussed in the paper, f took values below one. From that perspective, three
as an upper bound is reasonably large. However, for values of f larger than 3 it turns out that the solution
algorithm has difﬁculties to calculate a solution at all.
21Hence, this implies that the initial guess is at most 50 percent smaller or larger than the Ramsey steady
state. Note, however, that the Ramsey steady state itself varies considerably due to the random guesses
for the multiplier f. Hence, there is substantial random variation. However, for bounds lower than 0.5
or higher than 1.5 of the uniform distribution, the solution algorithm has difﬁculties to ﬁnd a solution.
Further, we have also attempted to examine randomly time varying initial guesses for each variable by e.g.
drawing a randomly time varying initial sequence for consumption etc. However, the solution algorithm
was not able to ﬁnd a solution in this case.
58guesses display now a considerable degree of randomization. Nevertheless, given
that the solution algorithm was able to ﬁnd a solution, I did not ﬁnd a single so-
lution that generated higher utility respectively welfare gains for the baseline and
“no conﬁscation/subsidy” reforms. In other words, the solution for the baseline and
“no conﬁscation/subsidy” reforms discussed in the paper represent very likely the
global maximum.
A.3 Welfare Calculations
In order to evaluate welfare consequences of the tax reforms we calculate permanent
private consumption equivalents 4
c that make the household indifferent between
the competitive equilibrium steady state and the Ramsey allocation.
















Given the preference speciﬁcation of section 2.3 I can explicitly solve for private
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u(¯ c, ¯ n, ¯ g).
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